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Case Comment
The Case of the Dead Judge: Fed. R. Civ. P. 63:
Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
On December 10, 1975, Cornelius Whalen, on behalf of Tow-
son Associates Limited Partnership (Towson), brought a diver-
sity action against Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford) for
breach of contract.' A jury trial commenced on March 31, 1980,
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
Judge C. Stanley Blair presiding. On April 20, after three
weeks of testimony, Judge Blair died and was replaced by
Judge Herbert F. Murray. At that time, Ford moved for a new
trial, arguing that rule 63 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure2 (Federal Rules) required Judge Murray to order a new
trial following Judge Blair's death. Judge Murray ruled that
rule 63 did not apply and ordered the trial to continue.3 Follow-
ing two more weeks of testimony, the jury returned a verdict
for Towson. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, 4 re-
versed Judge Murray, holding that, in a civil jury trial, rule 63
requires a successor judge to grant a new trial unless a verdict
has already been returned.5 WhaZlen v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
684 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 216 (1982).
Pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1934,6 authorizing promulga-
1. Whalen was Towson Associates' general partner. Whalen v. Ford Mo-
tor Credit Co., 475 F. Supp. 537, 538 (D. Md. 1979) (denial of motions for sum-
mary judgment). Ford had agreed to provide Towson with takeout financing for
an apartment-office building complex. When Ford refused to close the financ-
ing agreement, Whalen brought suit. Id. at 538-39.
2. FED. R. Crv. P. 63. See infra text accompanying note 9.
3. Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d 272, 273 (4th Cir. 1982).
4. Originally, a three judge panel heard the appeal, holding that rule 63
was inapplicable and that Judge Murray had properly exercised his discretion
in denying Ford's motion for a new trial. Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 32
Fed. 1L Serv. 2d 678 (Callaghan) (4th Cir. 1981). The Fourth Circuit, however,
granted a rehearing.
5. In addition to the question of rule 63's interpretation, the Fourth Cir-
cuit was asked to consider various other substantive issues. See Brief for Ap-
pellant, Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 216 (1982). These other issues, however, were not considered by the
Fourth Circuit sitting en banc, and are not material to this Comment.
6. Ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976)).
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tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme
Court recommended passage of rule 63, which permits judge
substitution in the event the judge originally assigned to a case
dies or becomes disabled.7 Rule 63, as enacted,8 provides:
If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge before
whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be
performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or
findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge
regularly sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was
tried may perform those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that
he cannot perform those duties because he did not preside at the trial
or for any other reason, he may in his discretion grant a new trial.9
Under this rule, it is apparent that once a jury has returned a
verdict or a trial judge has filed findings of fact and conclusions
of law, a successor judge may make any ruling that his or her
predecessor could have made.'0 Thus, a substitute judge may
rule on a motion for a new trial" or a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict,12 and may enter a formal judg-
ment on the jury's verdict or the trial judge's findings.13 If the
successor judge believes, however, that his or her presence at
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 63. Rule 63 is a successor to § 953 of the Revised Stat-
utes which provided for the authentication of bills of exceptions. Act of June 1,
1872, ch. 255, § 4, 17 Stat. 197 (repealed 1948). In response, however, to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of § 953 in Maloney v. Adsit, 175 U.S. 281 (1899),
that a bill of exceptions is invalid unless signed by the judge who sat at trial,
Congress amended the statute to deal with judge substitution. This amend-
ment explicitly authorized a successor judge to use discretion in deciding
whether to sign a bill of exceptions or order a new trial. Act of June 5, 1900, ch.
717, § 1, 31 Stat. 270 (repealed 1948). The amendment was intended to minimize
the hardship on litigants caused by a new trial, as well as to avoid unnecessary
delays and expenses in the justice system. See Letter from J.A. Flory to John
J. Jenkins, Chairman of Subcommittee No. 1 of the Judiciary Committee of the
House (March 10, 1900), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 658, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1900) (suggesting reasons for passage of the amendment).
8. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on September
16, 1938. R. MILLAR, CrIvL PROCEDURE OF THE TAL COURT iN HISTORIcAL PER-
sPECTIVE 62 (1952). Once the rules had been adopted by the Supreme Court,
the enabling act required that they be reported to Congress at the beginning of
a regular session in order to take effect. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). Since its enact-
ment, rule 63 has remained unamended. For a complete history of the Federal
Rules, see W. CHERRY, RULEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE Dism cT COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: DocuMENTARY HISTORY 1934-1938 (1939).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 63.
10. See Matanuska Valley Lines v. Neal, 229 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1955);
Miller v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 161 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D.D.C. 1958).
11. Berry v. School Dist., 494 F. Supp. 118, 120 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Miller v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 161 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D.D.C. 1958).
12. Miller v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 161 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D.D.C. 1958);
Lashbrook v. Kennedy Motor Lines, 119 F. Supp. 716, 717 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
13. Matanuska Valley Lines v. Neal, 229 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1955); Makah
Indian Tribe v. Moore, 93 F. Supp. 105 (WMD. Wash. 1950), rev'd on other
grountds, 192 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1951).
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trial is necessary to decide a motion or enter a judgment, the
successor may choose to grant a new trial instead.14
Since rule 63 expressly applies only "after a verdict is re-
turned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed," the
propriety of substitution before that point is uncertain. The
rule's silence regarding substitution before a verdict or the
filing of findings and conclusions has led to two conflicting in-
terpretations of the rule. One alternative is to interpret the
rule's requirement that a verdict be returned or findings and
conclusions fied as establishing a necessary precondition to
any judge substitution, thereby implicitly prohibiting substitu-
tion at any earlier point in the trial.1- A second alternative is to
interpret this requirement as merely defining the scope of the
rule's coverage, leaving the propriety of substitution before that
point to be determined independent of rule 63.16
A significant majority of federal courts interpreting rule 63
have adopted the first alternative,17 reasoning that a verdict or
findings are necessary preconditions to judge substitution.18
These courts, however, have dealt exclusively with challenges
14. Factors considered by the succeeding judge when determining whether
such rulings can be adequately made include whether the trial record includes
everything the judge feels is necessary for continuation, see St. Louis S.W. Ry.
Co. v. Henwood, 157 F.2d 337, 342 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 836 (1946);
whether the succeeding judge has been able to examine the trial record fully,
see infra text accompanying notes 31-33; and whether, in all fairness to the par-
ties, the trial judge should have observed the previous witnesses as they testi-
fied, see generally St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Henwood, 157 F.2d 337 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 836 (1946); infra text accompanying notes 30-38.
15. See cases cited infra note 17. See also infra text accompanying notes
44-52.
16. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. See also infra text ac-
companying notes 54-67.
17. See Arrow-Hart, Inc. v. Philip Carey Co., 552 F.2d 711, 713 (6th Cir.
1977); Brennan v. Grisso, 198 F.2d 532, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Arrow-Hart, Inc. v.
Covert Hills, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 346, 348 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Burrill v. Shaugnessy, 9
Fed. R. Serv. 918, 919 (N.D.N.Y. 1946); Ten-O-Win Amusement Co. v. Casino
Theatre, 2 F.R.D. 242,243 (N.D. Cal. 1942).
18. Since 1938, many states have either adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or have used them as a model in formulating state rules. For a com-
parison of each "state's rules of civil procedure to the Federal Rules, see Am.
JuR. 2D DESK Boox, Item No. 126 (1979). Those states assimilating rule 63 have
been confronted with the same problem of choosing between the two alterna-
tive interpretations. State courts faced with the issue, exclusively in the con-
text of nonjury trials, have overwhelmingly agreed with their federal
counterparts in adopting the first interpretation, reading the rule as implicitly
prohibiting substitution before findings of fact and conclusions of law are fied.
See, e.g., Pollastrine v. Severance, 375 P.2d 528, 529-30 (Alaska 1966); Sunshine
v. Sunshine, 30 Colo. App. 67, 72, 488 P.2d 1131, 1134 (1971); Girard Trust Bank v.
Easton, 12 N.C. App. 153, 155, 182 S.E.2d 645, 646 (1971).
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to substitution in nonjury trials.19 In Ten-O-Win Amusement Co.
v. Casino Theatre, 20 for example, where the trial judge died af-
ter orally directing entry of judgment but before approving pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that
the successor had no power to sign and file findings the prede-
cessor had left unsigned.2 ' Similarly, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, in Arrow-Hart, Inc. v. Philip Carey Co.,22
stated, "Since Rule 63 specifies that a new Judge may act
where the previous Judge had already made findings of fact
and conclusions of law, it follows that if the prior Judge had not
made those findings and conclusions, then a new trial is
required."23
At least one court, however, has interpreted rule 63's re-
quirement of a verdict or findings and conclusions as merely
establishing the scope of the rule.24 The United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, in In re Gar-
cia, 25 found that rule 63 is effectively inapplicable if findings of
fact and conclusions of law have not been filed, leaving continu-
ation of the trial largely to the succeeding judge's discretion.2 6
In Garcia, a naturalization proceeding,27 the successor dis-
posed of the case on the existing trial record without ordering a
new trial, commenting that the procedure was consistent with
rule 63.28 Apparently, Garcia is the only case explicitly adopt-
19. See Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d at 280 (Butzner, J.,
dissenting).
20. 2 F.R.D. 242 (NM). Cal. 1942).
21. Id. at 243. Ten-O-Win might be decided differently today. In 1947, rule
52(a) was amended by adding- "If an opinion or memorandum of decision is
filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear
therein." See Makah Indian Tribe v. Moore, 93 F. Supp. 105, 106 (W.D. Wash.
1950), rev'd on other grounds, 192 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1951).
22. 552 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1977) (presiding judge died following presentation
of the evidence, without having first made findings of fact or conclusions of
law).
23. Id. at 712.
24. See supra text accompanying note 16.
25. 65 F. Supp. 143 (WM). Pa. 1946). See also Bromberg v. Moul, 275 F.2d
574, 576 n.1, 578 (2d Cir. 1960) (declaring rule 63 inapplicable when no findings
and conclusions had been filed, but ordering a new trial due to the successor
judge's error in granting a summary judgment). Although Bromberg seems to
support the minority interpretation, the Whalen court cited it as indicating sup-
port for the majority view. See Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d at
274.
26. 65 F. Supp. at 143-44.
27. A naturalization proceeding is essentially a judicial proceeding, Tutun
v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 569 (1926), and thus the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are applicable. See In re Garcia, 65 F. Supp. at 146-47.
28. 65 F. Supp. at 14344.
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ing the minority position that rule 63's language merely defines
the scope of its coverage.29
The propriety of judge substitution has also been consid-
ered in cases not governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.3 0  Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules, a
substitute judge could continue a trial or rule on post-trial mo-
tions if such action did not require the judge to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses who had appeared before substitution.
In Cahill v. Mayflower Bus Lines, 31 the leading civil case per-
mitting substitution on this basis,32 the court held that a suc-
cessor judge was empowered to decide a motion for a directed
verdict, largely because "[i]t was not essential to have heard or
seen the witnesses to pass on this question."33 The Cahill
29. Other courts have suggested that, in circumstances not before them,
they might adopt the minority interpretation. In Welsh v. Brown-Graves Lum-
ber Co., 58 Ohio App. 2d 49, 389 N.E.2d 514 (1978), the Ohio court interpreted
Ohio Rule 63(B), which is substantially similiar to Federal Rule 63. See Omo
REv. CODE ANN. Civ. R. 63(B) (Page 1982). When the judge in a nonjury trial
became ill before rendering judgment, his successor continued the trial and
rendered judgment. On appeal, the court stated, "In this situation, the succes-
sor judge is in the position of rendering a judgment without having observed
the witnesses, and such is in violation of his judicial duties .... Where wit-
ness credibility is not a factor, a different situation is presented." 58 Ohio App.
2d at 51, 389 N.E.2d at 516. Thus, the Ohio court apparently did not read the
rule as implicitly prohibiting all prejudgment substitution.
30. Presumably, the minority interpretation of rule 63 which finds the rule
inapplicable before verdict or findings of fact and conclusions of law would rely
on this authority for evaluating such a substitution. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 24-29.
31. 77 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 629 (1935). In CahiZ the trial
judge reserved decision on a motion for a directed verdict until after the jury
returned a verdict. The verdict was returned, but the judge died before decid-
ing the motion. Id. at 839.
32. See also Thomas-Bonner Co. v. Hoover, Owens & Rentschler Co., 284 F.
386, 392-93 (6th Cir. 1922) (where neither party objected at the time, successor
held empowered to decide motions for directed verdict as well as whatever
questions of fact arose); Chandler v. Chandler, 92 Kan. 355, 361, 140 P. 858, 860
(1914) (holding that a new trial need not be granted by successor unless mo-
tion involved examination and weighing evidence and the credibility of wit-
nesses); Barton v. Burbank, 138 La. 997, 1000-01, 71 So. 134, 135 (1916) (where
trial judge retires before rendering judgment, successor held empowered to
give such judgment without hearing further testimony if parties originally had
full opportunityto cross examine witnesses); Clark v. Bailey, 99 Mont. 484, 487-
88, 44 P.2d 740, 742 (1935) (declaring that actual prejudice must result from
judge substitution before it will be considered a fatal irregularity, unless pro-
hibited by statute); Case v. Fox, 138 Or. 453, 457-58, 7 P.2d 267, 268 (1932) (hold-
ing that successor can complete any of the predecessor's incomplete acts not
involving comparison and weighing of testimony). Several state criminal cases
also have followed the rule cited in the text. See, e.g., York v. State, 91 Ark. 582,
586-87, 121 S.W. 1070, 1071 (1909); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 328 Pa. 27, 29,
195 A. 115, 117 (1937); infra note 41.
33. 77 F.2d at 840.
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court was apparently satisfied that the successor judge had ad-
equately prepared himself by studying the trial record.
Federal bankruptcy, tax, and administrative proceedings,
not subject to the Federal Rules,34 have continued to use this
"credibility test" to evaluate substitution. These courts have
generally recognized that a successor judge takes up where his
or her predecessor left off. If a new trial is ordered, it is "be-
cause of something in the past course of the litigation which
cannot be found in the status and record existing when the new
judge takes hold and which it is necessary for him ... to
know."35 To a substitute factfinder who has not had the oppor-
tunity to observe witnesses, the trial record may not contain
everything necessary for proper continuation of the trial.36 If,
on the other hand, continuing the trial does not involve a ques-
tion of credibility, the principal objection to substitution is
avoided,37 and a successor will be allowed to proceed with the
trial.38 The constitutionality of this procedure has been upheld
in the federal courts.39
The "credibility test," which developed before the enact-
ment of rule 63 and which is still used where the Federal Rules
do not apply, has also influenced the law of judge substitution
34. FED. R. Cxv. P. 81(a) (1) explicitly excludes bankruptcy proceedings
from its coverage and, unlike many of the other civil rules, rule 63 has not been
incorporated into the bankruptcy rules. See In re Schoenfleld, 608 F.2d 930, 933
(2d Cir. 1979). The Tax Court is governed by rules prescribed in accordance
with 26 U.S.C. § 7453 (1976). See 9 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 5820 (1979)
(Tax Court Rules of Procedure). Administrative procedure regarding substitu-
tion is dealt with under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1976). See New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. United States Nu-
clear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978) (A.P.A. § 554(d) applied
where chairperson of Licensing Board resigned during hearings).
35. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Henwood, 157 F.2d 337, 342 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 330 U.S. 836 (1946) (bankruptcy proceeding where trial judge died before
concluding a hearing on a railroad reorganization plan).
36. See In re Schoenfleld, 608 F.2d 930, 935 (2d Cir. 1979) (bankruptcy pro-
ceeding upholding district court's order for a new trial following expiration of
the trial judge's term).
37. See Annot., 83 A.L.R2d 1032, 1033 (1962) (discussion of substitution of
judge in criminal case).
38. See Amoroso v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 583, 586 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 926 (1952) (fact that the successor reached a decision without presiding
at the Tax Court trial did not violate due process since the decision involved no
credibility evaluation). See also New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87, 100 (1st Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing no abuse of discretion to deny new administrative hearing because there
was no credibility evaluation required); Gamble-Skogrmo, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Comr'n, 211 F.2d 106, 117-18 (8th Cir. 1954) (setting aside agency decision be-
cause it was materially based on the succeeding examiner's credibility evalua-
tion of evidence heard by his predecessor).
39. Amoroso v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d at 586.
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in the area of criminal procedure. In reaction to an increase in
the number of lengthy criminal trials4o and to restrictive inter-
pretations of the existing Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure,41 the Supreme Court, in 1966, amended criminal rule 25 to
explicitly allow prejudgment substitution.42 The amendment
seems to acknowledge that in jury trials judges need not evalu-
ate the credibility of witnesses,4 3 and that substitution does not
necessarily prejudice the proceedings. Under the amended
rule, substitution is basically left to the successor's discretion.
This discretion reflects the same "credibility test" that is evi-
dent in civil cases before the adoption of the Federal Rules.
No court prior to Whalen had occasion to consider the pro-
priety of judge substitution in a civil jury trial before the return
of the verdict.44 Judge Murnaghan, writing for the majority,4 5
40. See FED. R. Cmi. P. 25 advisory committee note on the 1966 amend-
ment, reprinted in 3 L. ORFmLD, CRnmINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES § 25:1 (1966).
41. In Freeman v. United States, 227 F. 732 (2d Cir. 1915), motion for modifi-
cation denied, 237 F. 815 (2d Cir. 1916), for example, the court held that in a
criminal jury trial the judge must observe the demeanor of'the witnesses and
have before him the same evidence as the jury in order to insure the defendant
a constitutionally valid trial. Id. at 759. This seemed to bar substitution except
where the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which until amended in 1966
were identical to the civil rules in all relevant respects, specifically authorized
it. Subsequent decisions, however, have severely eroded the basis for the Free-
man decision. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (right to a 12
member jury trial can be waived in a felony case); Simons v. United States, 119
F.2d 539, 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 616 (1941) (jury trial may be
waived in a criminal case). See also Annot., 83 A.LR. 2d 1032, 1036 (1962) (dis-
cussion of Freeman).
42. The amendment, which became criminal rule 25(a), provided:
If by reason of death, sickness or other disability the judge before
whom a jury trial has commenced is unable to proceed with the trial,
any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court, upon certi-
fying that he has familiarized himself with the record of the trial, may
proceed with and finish the trial.
FED. R. Cnme. P. 25(a). The original rule 25, which was substantially similar to
civil rule 63, became rule 25(b). For a comprehensive history of criminal rule
25, see 3 L. ORFIELD, CRlwINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RuLEs § 25
(1966).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 79-84.
44. The subject was discussed in the British case, Coleshill v. Manchester
Corporation, [1928] 1 K.B. 785. There the trial judge died before the jury re-
turned the verdict, and the court allowed the succeeding judge to conclude the
trial. The following dicta, however, casts grave doubt on the precedential value
of that action:
I doubt whether a judge has any jurisdiction to continue the hearing of
a case in which witnesses have been called in Court in the course of a
trial before the jury and another judge, it not being a case of evidence
being taken on commission or before an examiner.
Id. at 786.
45. Judge Murnaghan was joined in the-majority by Judges Russell, Wid-
1983]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
rejected Whalen's contention that a basis exists for distinguish-
ing between jury and nonjury cases in the prejudgment period
of a trial, noting that rule 63 applies similarly to jury and non-
jury trials.46 To Murnaghan, the history of rule 63 clearly ne-
gates any intent on the part of the rule's framers to permit
judge substitution under conditions other than those expressly
provided for in the rule.47 As evidence, Murnaghan noted the
absence of any pre-rule practice customarily permitting judge
substitution despite the objection of one of the parties, sug-
gesting that rule 63's silence could not be interpreted as sub
silentio approval of judge substitution in those circumstances
not expressly covered by the rule.48 In addition, Murnaghan
quoted transcript extracts from the 1953 meeting of the Advi-
sory Committee on the civil rules, at which the Committee con-
sidered but rejected an amendment expressly authorizing
substitution during trial. These extracts, Murnaghan felt,
clearly demonstrated the committee members' belief that sub-
stitution was not permissible under the existing rules without a
stipulation of the parties. 4 9
As further proof, Murnaghan contrasted the development
of rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with that
of rule 63.50 After recognizing the previously existing similarity
between the two rules, Murnaghan noted that the Advisory
Committee on the criminal rules approved an amendment to
rule 25 authorizing substitution during trial,51 while its counter-
part committee took no action to amend the civil rules, further
demonstrating to Murnaghan that the civil rulemakers were
content with the existing authorization of substitution only af-
ter a verdict is returned or findings and conclusions are fMled.52
Thus, Murnaghan adopted the majority view that rule 63 im-
plicitly prohibits substitution except where expressly
ener, Ervin and Chapman. Judge Butzner dissented and was joined by Judges
Hall, Phillips and Sprouse. Chief Judge Winter, although sympathetic to the
views of the dissent, concurred specially, largely because had he not done so,
the court would have been evenly split and, thus, powerless to act. 684 F.2d at
279 (Winter, C.J., concurring specially).
46. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
47. 684 F.2d at 275.
48. See id. at 274.
49. Id. at 275-77. See Proceedings of the Advisory Committee on the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, May 20, 1953 (Charles E. Clark Papers, Yale Uni-
versity Library) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review). Charles Clark served
as reporter to the Advisory Committee, as well as dean of the Yale Law School
and judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
50. 684 F.2d at 277. See supra note 42.
51. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
52. 684 F.2d at 278.
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permitted.5 3
Although it is true that rule 63 does not distinguish be-
tween jury and nonjury trials, the relevance of rule 63 to the
facts in Whalen depends on its applicability to judge substitu-
tion before a verdict is returned or findings and conclusions are
filed. The history of rule 63 does not necessarily show, as Judge
Murnaghan believed, that the drafters intended to alter the pre-
rule practice concerning substitution before the return of a ver-
dict or filing of findings and conclusions. The Advisory Com-
mittee's note accompanying rule 63 indicates that the rule was
meant to supersede 28 U.S.C. § 776, which authorized a suc-
ceeding judge to sign bills of exceptions.54 Since a bill of ex-
ceptions, by definition, followed a decision or opinion by a
judge or jury,55 section 776 did not affect any procedure prior to
such a decision or opinion. By superseding this provision, rule
63 extended the successor's power to include "all duties to be
performed ... after verdict or judgment."5 6  Nothing in the
rule's official history mentions any intention to change
procedures before a verdict or judgment, and inasmuch as the
statute it superseded did not deal with such procedures, it is
53. In an opinion highly reminiscent of that of the original three judge
panel, 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 678 (4th Cir. 1981), Judge Butzner led the
dissenters in challenging virtually every conclusion of the majority. He argued
that neither rule 63 nor any other rule expressly prohibits pre-verdict substitu-
tion. 684 F.2d at 280. The dissent traced the rule's official legislative history to
show that it was not promulgated to bar substitution in a jury trial, id. at 280-81,
and refused to rely on subsequent informal history to demonstrate a contrary
intent, id. at 281. To the dissent, it was equally inappropriate to use an amend-
ment to criminal rule 25 to interpret rule 63. Criminal rule 25, unlike civil rule
63, had been severely restricted by a decision that could not be avoided without
an amendment. See s-upra note 41. Since the scope of rule 63 did not include
substitution before verdict, the dissent reasoned, civil rule 83 supported the ex-
ercise of discretion in denying Ford's motion for a new trial. 684 F.2d at 282.
See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
54. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee's note accompanying rule 63
stated.
This rule adapts and extends the provisions of U.S.C. Title 28, former
§ 776 (Bill of exceptions; authentication; signing of by judge) to include
all duties to be performed by the judge after verdict or judgment. The
statute is therefore superseded.
FED. R. CIv. P. 63 advisory committee note.
55. A bill of exceptions was a "formal statement in writing of the excep-
tions taken to the opinion, decision, or direction of the judge, delivered during
the trial of the case, setting forth the proceedings on the trial, the opinion or
decision given, and the exceptions taken thereto, and sealed by the judge in
testimony of its correctness." 4 AM. JuP. 2D Appeal and Error § 417 (1962). See
Conner v. Pritchard, 115 Ind. App. 55, 60, 54 N.E.2d 283, 285 (1944). In the fed-
eral courts, bills of exceptions have been abolished. 4 AM. JuP. 2D Appeal and
Error § 417 n.7 (1962 & Supp. 1982).
56. FED. R. CIv. P. 63 advisory committee note. See supra note 54.
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unlikely that the drafters of the Federal Rules intended to
change any prejudgment procedure by their silence in rule 63.
The 1953 proceedings of the Advisory Committee support
this conclusion.5 7 While debating an amendment to rule 63
which would have authorized a successor judge to take testi-
mony and evidence to complete a trial, Chairman William
Mitchell argued against the amendment as being outside the
scope of the rule. According to Mitchell, rule 63 "only relates to
cases where the judge who tried it [sic] has died after making
findings of fact and conclusions of law."58 Apparently Mitchell
believed that rule 63 does not apply when the substitution is to
take place before a verdict is returned or findings and conclu-
sions are flled.59 The Committee demonstrated its agreement
with this point of view by leaving the rule unamended.
Judge Murnaghan based his interpretation of rule 63 in
large part60 on Chairman Mitchell's conclusion that prejudg-
ment substitution was not allowed under the existing Federal
Rules.61 It appears, however, that Mitchell and Murnaghan did
not arrive at this conclusion via the same route.62 Twice during
the debate over the proposed amendment, Mitchell commented
that no previous statute or rule allowed substitution before ver-
57. Arguably, these proceedings are of very little use in determining the in-
tent of the rule's drafters. The Whalen majority cited these private papers as
support for its interpretation of rule 63. See 684 F.2d at 275 n.8. Butzner's dis-
senting opinion, however, reasoned that most of the discussions concerning
rule 63 found in the papers of Charles Clark, see supra note 49, took place years
after the Federal Rules took effect. See 684 F.2d at 281. Butzner then cited
Consumer Products Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13(1980), to show that the Supreme Court has cautioned against utilizing less for-
mal types of subsequent legislative history to show intent. See 684 F.2d at 281.
Moreover, he argued that the Judicial Conference had many years ago decided
that the official text of the committee's working papers should not be made ac-
cessible for litigation. See id. (citing Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Judge
Francis D. Murnaghan, Jr. (Dec. 18, 1981)).
58. Proceedings of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, supra note 49, at 572-73. Later in the same debate, Mitchell reiter-
ated his opposition to the amendment on the same grounds, stating, "But [the
amendment] doesn't cover the point that I had, because this rule in the first
clause only relates to cases where there has been a verdict or findings of fact
and conclusions of law have been filed." Id. at 574. Again later he saich '"The
whole rule is limited in its application to cases where there is a verdict or find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law." Id.
59. See also supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
60. See Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d at 276-77.
61. For instance, Mitchell stated, "We came to the conclusion that under
the existing rule, the only way a judge could take up a case which has been
tried by another judge but he hasn't decided it, is by stipulation." Proceedings
of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note
49, at 572-73.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
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dict or judgment.63 It seems, therefore, that his conclusion
rested not on a determination that rule 63 itself prohibited pre-
judgment substitution, but rather on his belief that no author-
ity expressly permitted such substitution.64 Thus, Chairman
Mitchell's comments cannot be taken as an endorsement of the
majority position that rule 63 implicitly prohibits prejudgment
substitution.
Moreover, Judge Murnaghan's reliance on the amendment
of the criminal rules proves too much. Amending the criminal
rules to provide specifically for judge substitution in jury trials
does not necessarily reflect a judgment on the part of the Advi-
sory Committee on the criminal rules that language identical to'
that of rule 63 precluded such substitution.65 What it does re-
flect is that the Advisory Committee considered judge substitu-
tion appropriate in criminal jury trials in circumstances other
than those specifically covered by rule 63.66 Consequently, the
amendment of the criminal rules, far from proving that rule 63
of the civil rules precludes prejudgment substitution, suggests
that prejudgment substitution would be equally desirable at
least with respect to civil jury trials.67
The Whalen majority also failed to consider the Federal
Rules' policy of discouraging unnecessary cost and prolonged
63. 'There seems to be no statute or rule under which any other judge can
take over on the typewritten record and decide the case." Proceedings of the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 49, at
572. Later, Mitchell again stated, "Here is a case where the trial judge died and
you have had a long transcript of testimony taken. He is dead, and there is no
law or rule that allows another judge to take over the case on a transcript made
by the preceding judge who is now dead." Id. at 573.
64. It should be noted that the amendment considered and rejected at the
1953 meeting of the Advisory Committee would have authorized substitution in
civil bench trials only. The Committee apparently did not consider the issue of
substitution in civil jury trials.
65. For example, Judge Butzner, in dissent, suggested that an amendment
to the criminal rules was necessary to permit prejudgment substitution in crim-
inal cases because of court decisions holding that a criminal defendant was en-
titled to a trial judge who had heard the evidence and observed the demeanor
of witnesses. See supra note 41. Since no such decisions restrict the develop-
ment of the civil rules, however, such an amendment would not be necessary to
authorize prejudgment substitution. See Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684
F.2d at 284 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
66. Rule 25 of the criminal rules was virtually identical to rule 63 of the
civil rules prior to the 1966 criminal rule amendments. See supra notes 40.42
and accompanying text.
67. In addition, Butzner stated that 'there are neither logical nor prag-
matic reasons for allowing a criminal jury trial . . .to go forward after the
death of the trial judge while a civil jury trial, involving lesser stakes, must in-
evitably grind to a halt ...." Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d at 284
(Butzner, J., dissenting).
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delays in the administration of justice.68 Rule 1 embodies this
policy by stating that the primary purpose of the Federal Rules
is to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action. 69 If rule 63 is interpreted as implicitly prohibiting
substitution in all cases where the judge dies or becomes dis-
abled before the verdict is returned, the duration and cost of
trials will, by definition, increase. This sort of inefficiency is a
source of concern to many7 O and is precisely what the adoption
of the Federal Rules was designed to avoid. Moreover, the Fed-
eral Rules were meant to be interpreted to avoid strict, techni-
cal interpretations that could work hardship on litigants.7 ' The
Whalen majority failed to consider that in many complex civil
cases, as well as in most cases involving private individuals as
litigants, requiring a new trial in all cases where the judge dies
before judgment might very well cause extreme hardship in
terms of time and money.72 Therefore, interpreting rule 63's
language as merely defining the scope of its coverage73 more
closely coincides with the Federal Rules' spirit of promoting ef-
ficiency and of avoiding hardship.
Reading rule 63 so that it does not apply where the trial
judge dies or becomes disabled before the verdict is returned
or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed leaves a gap
in the Federal Rules' coverage. Such gaps are filled by rule 83,
which authorizes each district court to adopt its own policy
when a subject such as prejudgment substitution is not con-
68. Of course, the proper administration of justice to the parties should be
the most important consideration in interpreting a rule such as this, but requir-
ing a new trial in every case where a judge dies or becomes disabled before a
verdict is returned is not necessary for the proper administration of justice.
See St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Henwood, 157 F.2d 337, 342 (8th Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 836 (1947). See also infra text accompanying notes 79-84.
69. FED. R. Crv. P. 1. Several courts have recognized this principle. See,
e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 386-87 (1978); Des Isles v. Evans,
225 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1955); Boysell Co. v. Colonial Coverlet Co., 29 F. Supp.
122, 124 (E.D. Tenn. 1939). Avoiding excessive cost and delay is as important
today as it was when the rules were enacted. Since World War II, the average
duration of a civil case in the United States District Courts has increased from
approximately .9 years, to 1.16 years in 1980. Clark, Adjudication to Adminis-
tration . A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, 55 S. CAL. L REV. 65, 80 (1981). See generally Comment, Federal District
Courts-Too Much for Too Long: Due Process and the Civil Litigan 9 Cum. L
REv. 523 (1978).
70. See, e.g., Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Antici-
pation, 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976); Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Meeting of
the America Law Institute (May 20, 1964), reprinted in 35 F..D. 181 (1964).
71. See United States v. One Ford Coupe, 26 F. Supp. 598, 598 (M.D. Pa.
1939).
72. See Comment, supra note 69, at 525.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 24-29.
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trolled by a specific rule.74 The logical step for these courts is
to adopt the pre-rule practice still followed by courts not sub-
ject to the Federal Rules. 75 This practice allows prejudgment
substitution when the succeeding judge would not be required
to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. 76 Moreover, the history
of rule 63 demonstrates that the drafters did not intend to inter-
fere with pre-rule practice in areas not specifically covered by
rule 63.77 Thus, the common law "credibility test" should con-
trol all cases not specifically within the scope of the rule.78
The "credibility test" delineates a clear distinction between
jury and nonjury trials. The trial judge's functions and duties
vary markedly depending on whether the proceeding is before
a jury or a judge.79 The area where these functions differ the
most is in the judge's power to decide issues of fact. In a bench
trial, the judge acts as the sole arbiter of both questions of fact
and issues of law,80 and is required to summarize his or her
findings and conclusions.8 1 When the case is tried before a
jury, however, the judge relinquishes many of these duties to
the jury. If the facts are completely undisputed and admit of
no conflicting interpretations or inferences, the issue is one of
law, solely for the judge to decide.82 Any questions of fact,
however, are for the jury to decide.83 As part of their duty to
resolve questions of fact, jurors must evaluate the credibility of
witnesses and determine how much weight to give their testi-
mony. In a jury trial, questions of fact are within the exclusive
province of the jury.84 A successor judge who has not seen the
74. The relevant portion of FED. R. Crv. P. 83 reads: "In all cases not pro-
vided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with these rules."
75. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39. Even though Advisory Com-
mittee Chairman Mitchell assumed no prejudgment substitution was allowed
before the enactment of the Federal Rules, see supra note 63, he seems to have
misread prior case law.
76. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. See also 58 Am. JUR. 2D
New Trial § 202 (1971) (new trial should be directed where credibility of wit-
ness is involved).
77. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 30-39.
79. For a discussion of the duties of judges, see generally A. VANDERBiLT,
JUDGES AND JURORS: THEiR FUNCTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS, AND SELECTION (1956).
80. Id. at 8.
81. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
82. See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Smith & Oby
Co., 272 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir. 1959).
83. See, e.g., Pinson v. Young, 100 Kan. 452, 456, 164 P. 1102, 1104 (1917). See
generally Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHL L.
REV. 386 (1954).
84. 75 Am. JUR 2D TWal § 321 (1974).
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witnesses or heard their testimony could complete a jury trial
begun by a predecessor, since it would not be the successor's
function to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
A judge's varying duties in jury and nonjury trials provide
a natural basis for distinguishing between the two types of tri-
als in determining the propriety of substitution when rule 63
does not apply. Consequently, if rule 63 does not control judge
substitution prior to the return of a verdict or filing of findings
and conclusions,85 Judge Murnaghan should not have dis-
missed a distinction between jury and nonjury trials on the ba-
sis of rule 63 alone. The foregoing arguments suggest not only
that such a distinction makes sense but that it is consistent
with the results, if not the reasoning, of the post-rule cases that
considered the propriety of judge substitution before the filing
of findings and conclusions in nonjury trials.86
The profferred distinction between jury and nonjury cases
might be objected to on several grounds. For example, one
may argue that, in submitting a case to the jury, a federal trial
judge, in his or her discretion, may comment on the evidence
and express an opinion on the facts.87 Since a successor has
not heard all the evidence in person,88 he or she arguably can-
not adequately comment on the evidence when submitting the
case to the jury. The decision whether to comment on the evi-
dence, however, is generally discretionary on the judge's part.89
Moreover, the jury is not bound by any comment the judge may
make.9 0 A successor, therefore, could choose not to comment,
to avoid unfairness to either party.
Similarly, one may argue that, in a jury trial, a successor
judge may be asked to direct a verdict on the basis of evidence
he or she did not see presented. Upon analysis, however, this
argument does not challenge the appropriateness of substitu-
tion before the verdict is returned. In directing a verdict, a
85. See supra text accompanying notes 54-67.
86. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. Although one could con-
ceive of a case where a substitute judge in a bench trial would not have to eval-
uate the credibility of witnesses in order to finish the trial, in most cases such
evaluation will be necessary and a new trial will be warranted. See, e.g., cases
cited supra note 17.
87. The trial judge should comment on the facts whenever it is believed to
be necessary to assist the jury. See 75 AM. JuR. 2D Trial § 658 (1974).
88. See Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1032, 1033 (1962) (successor judge is denied op-
portunity to observe deportment and demeanor of testifying witnesses).
89. Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 95 U.S. 232, 238 (1877).
90. Emich Motors v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 571-72 (1951);
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933); Doyle v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
147 U.S. 413, 430 (1893).
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judge does not evaluate the credibility of witnesses; rather, the
judge resolves all questions of credibility in favor of the non-
moving party.91 Moreover, a motion for directed verdict in-
volves the same issues as a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.). 92 Since the judgment n.o.v.
motion is filed after the verdict is returned, rule 63 clearly al-
lows a successor discretion to decide it.93 There is no logic to a
rule that prohibits a successor judge from ruling on a motion
for directed verdict, while permitting him or her to rule on an
equivalent motion once a verdict is returned.
Because of the uncertainty concerning the proper scope of
rule 63, the Supreme Court should amend the rule specifically
to permit judge substitution during trial. This Comment sug-
gests that rule 63 be amended to read as follows:
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 63: If by reason of death,
sickness or other disability the judge before whom a trial has com-
menced is unable to proceed with the trial, any other judge regularly
sitting in or assigned to the court may in his discretion proceed with
and finish the tria but if continuing the trial requires such other judge
to rule on the credibility of witnesses who have previously testified
before the predecessor judge, or if the succeeding judge is satisfied that
he cannot adequately familiarize himself with the record of the trial, he
shall grant a new trial. If the trial judge dies or becomes disabled after
a verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed,
the succeeding judge may in his discretion perform all duties remain-
ing to be performed.
The proposed rule explicitly adopts the "credibility test" upon
which prejudgment substitution should rely,94 and it permits
the successor to use discretion in deciding whether to continue
a trial even if the successor judge is not called upon to rule on
the credibility of witnesses.9 5 It further allows substitution in a
bench trial in the unlikely situation where credibility is not a
91. See Yazzie v. Sullivent, 561 F.2d 183, 188 (10th Cir. 1977); Banks v.
Koehring Co., 538 F.2d 176, 178 (8th Cir. 1976); Guam Fed'n of Teachers, Local
1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); John-
son v. Geffen, 294 F.2d 197, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
92. See Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1978)i Dulin v. Cir-
cle F. Indus., Inc., 558 F.2d 456, 465 (8th Cir. 1977); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons,
Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243, 253-54 (E.D. Pa. 1979), cert denied, 451 U.S.
911 (1981).
93. See cases cited supra note 12.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 30-43.
95. For example, a successor may want to grant a new trial, even though
no credibility evaluation is necessary, when the successor determines that the
delay caused by the trial judge's inability to proceed with the trial and the suc-
cessor's need to familiarize himself with the record would confuse or distract
the jury and cause them to forget important aspects of the previous portion of
the trial.
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factor.9 6 Moreover, it provides that a successor may make any
decision his or her predecessor could have made when substi-
tution occurs after a verdict is returned or findings of fact and
conclusions of law are filed. This ensures that the intent of the
original rule 63 is fulfilled.97 The proposed rule 63, therefore,
would overrule the Whalen decision,. and further the spirit of
the Federal Rules by promoting efficiency and avoiding
hardship.98
In choosing to interpret rule 63's requirement that a verdict
be returned or findings and conclusions filed as a necessary
precondition to any substitution, the Fourth Circuit's majority
opinion in Whalen relied very heavily on inflexible statutory in-
terpretation and dogmatic analysis of Advisory Committee
hearings that provide a questionable basis for determining the
intent of the rule. While Judge Murnaghan's opinion did not di-
rectly contradict any authority, a reasoned approach to the his-
tory of judge substitution, including the rule's enactment, its
judicial treatment, and the subsequent Advisory Committee
proceedings, suggests that the court's holding is based on a
misconception of what the rule was intended to achieve. These
sources clearly show that rule 63 does not prohibit preverdict
substitution.
When rule 63 does not apply, common law principles
should govern the appropriateness of judge substitution. The
common law practice, still used where the Federal Rules do not
apply, follows a "credibility test," allowing the successor to use
discretion in deciding whether to continue the trial unless the
successor is required to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
In a civil jury trial, a successor judge is not required to evaluate
credibility; evaluating credibility is the sole province of the
jury. It follows that substitution should be appropriate in most
civil jury trials. The adoption of a credibility test to determine
the propriety of judge substitution when rule 63 does not ex-
pressly apply would save litigants time and money, and would
be consistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules. This Com-
ment has suggested that the civil rules be amended specifically
96. See supra note 86. It is interesting to note that since criminal rule
25(a) is limited to jury trials, see supra note 42, all prejudgment substitution is
apparently still prohibited when a criminal defendant waives the right to a jury
trial. Since the "credibility test" is the basis for allowing substitution, the pro-
posed civil rule 63 should encompass bench trials where credibility is not a
factor.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
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to sanction use of the credibility test in such circumstances, to
eliminate any doubt caused by decisions such as Whalen v.
Ford Motor Credit Co.
